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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between policies facilitating domestic economic
freedom in Sub-Saharan African states and the degree of regional integration of those states
into their respective regional economic communities. It conducts a linear regression analysis
with data from the Economic Freedom of the World Report 2017 and the AFRICA Regional
Integration Index to conduct a quantitative study of Sub-Saharan African states. The regression
finds strong evidence that domestic economic freedom is a significant contributing factor,
between 5% and 15% causality, to a state’s degree of regional integration. The paper
hypothesizes that private sector political and economic activity is the causal mechanism for
such a relationship. It examines the case study of Botswana to test this hypothesis in a
plausibility probe, examining policies across time, and especially the establishment of
Botswana’s High Level Consultative Council. Finally, it proposes several potential avenues for
further research.
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Domestic Economic Freedom and Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa

Introduction
The African community has pursued regional integration of various types since the end
of colonialism. National, regional, and international actors regularly express support for
regional integration, though the effectiveness of integration schemes and the actual
commitment of actors to the project have been spotty at best. Nonetheless, regional
integration, at least as an ideal, has seen strong and consistent support from the African Union,
the African Development Bank, the United Nations, and other important players. Stefan
Nelletamby, Acting Vice President of the Infrastructure, Private Sector and Regional Integration
section at the African Development Bank, writes that:
Integration is at the foundation of Africa’s future. A future that will be
forged by its 1.1 billion citizens and growing young population; a future of
opportunities with a marketplace of 54 countries and growing consumer
purchasing power; and a future where Africa is open for business with the
rest of the world, competing in higher value goods and services.1
Up until recently, measures of regional integration were irregular and created a “knowledge
gap.”2 However, with the completion of the AFRICA Regional Integration Index, a project
created by the collaboration of the African Union, the African Development Bank Group, and
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, we now have the first comprehensive
measure of regional integration across every nation and regional economic community in Africa
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“Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016,” African Union Commission, African Development Bank Group,
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, (2015), https://www.integrateafrica.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/ARII-Report2016_EN_web.pdf, 5.
2
“Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016,” 5.
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with which to “identify particular strengths and gaps…[and] follow their progress and changes
over time.”3
The index, which has defined indicators and dimensions by which integration can be
measured, does not make any causal claims as to why some states are more integrated than
others. This leaves open the question of what potential causal factors aid or hinder regional
integration. While there are innumerable possible angles with which to approach this new
wealth of data, this project will focus on an often understudied factor in regional integration:
domestic economic freedom.
This quantitative and qualitative study will attempt to answer the following question: do
domestic reforms supporting economic freedom facilitate regional integration? This is broad
question, but its answer will prove most poignant for states where regional integration and its
economic benefits are the least realized. Sub-Saharan African presents a test set with numerous
observations and enormous practical application because states similar to the average African
state likely have the most to benefit from increased regional integration. For this reason, this
study will determine if there is a robust relationship between the degree of regional integration
into RECs and domestic policies facilitating economic freedom in Sub-Saharan African states.
Even if this is found, however, a purely quantitative study cannot establish the mechanisms for
such a relationship. A case study Botswana will be used to resolve this and attempt to draw out
the causal links.
As already noted, states in Sub-Saharan African have long espoused the goal of
increasing regional and continental integration, but progress has been mixed since the
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“Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016,” 7.
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formation of the African Union and the gradual proliferation of regional economic organizations
(RECs). Many integration efforts, such as those originating in the 1970s, have focused on
regional governmental cooperation, reducing tariffs, and other macro-level integration
methods of various kinds. While these factors are no doubt important, this macro-level
integration has faced numerous challenges. As De Melo and Tsikata point out, if regional
integration efforts are entirely dependent on political actors, then progress will be particularly
difficult and sporadic because the issue becomes political in nature.4 Intergovernmental
conflicts have historically been a barrier to regional integration, the most dramatic example
being the disbanding of the East African Community in 1977 due to Tanzania and Uganda going
to war.
On the economic side, tariffs, currency stability, and freedom of movement have long
been the focus of integration advocates. While these are essential factors, the focus on these
has arguably marginalized research into the importance of eliminating domestic factors, such as
non-tariff barriers (NTBs), which create smaller but crucial transaction costs for the private
sector. While regional integration is and must be a project of national governments, private
actors (firms and individuals) will necessarily be doing much of the actual work of integration. In
addition, should the private sector have the capacity to pursue regional projects and exchanges
across national lines due to positive incentives (domestic economic freedom), it could help
create a positive feedback loop and put pressure on political actors to overcome other macrolevel economic, political, and social barriers to integration.
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Jaime De Melo and Yvonne Tsikata, "Regional Integration in Africa: Challenges and Prospects," IDEAS Working
Paper Series from RePEc, 2015, IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc, 2015.
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Regional Integration and Regional Economic Communities
Regional integration can be understood in a variety of ways, but it always involves
increased interaction and coordination between and among generally geographically proximate
states. These interactions can take the form of economic agreements (like the North American
Free Trade Agreement) or of more complex governmental structures (like in the European
Union). One can identify several levels of regional integration, ordered according to increasing
integration commitment: free trade areas, customs unions, common markets, economic
unions, and political unions. Sub-Saharan African RECs generally fall into the first three
categories.5 Worldwide, states pursue regional integration…
…not only to increase cross-border trade and investment but also to raise citizens’
living standards and pursue other legitimate national interests such as
governance, security, human development, social-cultural exchanges, migration,
and raising the country’s geopolitical position in the region or globally.6
In Sub-Saharan Africa, regional integration and regionalism are often referred to in both
political and economic terms and generally are viewed as a response or reaction to the
globalizing economy.7 As previously noted, increased regional integration seems to be a near
universal point of agreement among relevant actors.
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Moses Kiggundu and Kaitlyn DeGhetto, “Regional Integration: Review of the Management Literature and
Implications for Theory, Policy, and Practice,” Africa Journal of Management 2015 1 (4): 305. Kiggundu and
DeGhetto define the three relevant types as follows: “Free Trade Area: Partner countries agree to remove tariff
and non-tariff barriers to trade, but each member decides its own barriers against nonmembers….Customs Union:
Partner countries remove all barriers to trade among themselves, erect a common trade policy against
nonmembers….Common Market: Combines free trade and customs union by removing all barriers to trade and the
movement of labor and capital among members. Members erect a common trade policy against nonmembers….”
6
Ibid., 304.
7
Ian Taylor and Fredrik Soderbaum. “Region-Building Beyond the State: Modes of Regional Governance in Africa,”
in The New Politics of Regionalism: Perspectives from Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacific, Ed. Ulf, Routledge
Studies in Globalisation, London ; New York: Routledge, 2017, 134.
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A recent expression of this agreement is the 2016 AFRICA Regional Integration Index.
Resulting from the combined efforts of the African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Union
Commission (AUC), and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the index is an extensive
quantitative examination of regional integration across Africa. Most simply put, the index
measures regional integration in terms of five Dimensions and sixteen Indicators grouped under
them (see fig. 1).

fig.1 (“Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016,” 11.)
Regional economic communities (RECs), are the primary method by which the African states
hopes to increase regional integration. These economic communities, as the name indicates,
are intended to initially be regional, with the eventual goal of a continental African economic
community. For this reason, the index’s Dimensions and Indicators are measured for each state
qua member of a regional economic community.

6

The African Union (AU) recognizes eight RECs in Africa: CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel–
Saharan States); COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa); EAC (East African
Community); ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States); ECOWAS (Economic
Community of West African States); IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development);
SADC (Southern African Development Community); and UMA (Arab Maghreb Union).8 Most
African states are members of more than one REC, and some have memberships in as many as
three RECs concurrently (see fig. 2).

fig.2 (“Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016,” 16.)
However, RECs in Sub-Saharan Africa are not always directly comparable. They often have
different foci or emphases, and demand differing levels of commitment from member states.

8

While UMA is a REC under the AU, this study will focus on Sub-Saharan Africa RECs—the other seven.
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This is reflected in the African Development Bank’s measurements of their five dimensions of
regional integration. For example, ECOWAS scores the highest of the RECs on Dimension 4, the
free movement of people, but relatively low on Dimension 1, trade integration. The EAC,
however, scores the highest on trade integration, but the lowest on Dimension 5, financial and
macroeconomic integration. Among all RECs, Dimensions 2 and 3, regional infrastructure and
productive integration, have the least variation in scores, with average scores fairly close
together.9 That said, the AFRICA Regional Integration Index measures all RECs according to the
same criteria, and final index scores are combinations of the all Dimension and Indicator scores.

Why Regional Integration?
Regional integration has been a priority for African leadership in part because SubSaharan African states are poorly positioned in the global market. To start, Sub-Saharan African
states are “not a party to any…mega-regional trade negotiations” such as the Trans-Pacific
Partnership negotiations.10 And with the failure of the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round,
“the risk for Africa in this is that new rules and market access preferences agreed under the
mega-regional FTAs will make it increasingly difficult for African businesses to compete
globally.”11 To compensate for this and other historic economic disadvantages, regional
integration has long been an attractive prospect. 12 Research consistently shows that regional
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“Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016,” 16-17
Joshua P. Meltzer, “Expanding African Trade: Creating a Comparative Advantage and Strengthening Regional
Partnerships,” In Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2016, 2016: 91.
11
Ibid., 91.
12
Some scholars argue that regional integration efforts that point towards competition global market ultimately
undermine the well-being of Africans by making governments facilitators of global capital “rather than the
protector against these forces, which is the classical task of mercantilist nation- building and public
governance” (Taylor and Soderbaum, 138). Their critique is more specifically of “neoliberalism” and how it results
10
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integration and more open trade policy results in economic improvement both in individual
member states of RECs and as a whole.13
Regional integration has also been seen as a way to ease the entry of Sub-Saharan
African economies into the global economy. African firms could start with “the dynamic but
more easily accessible African markets” to prepare “for the greater rigor and competition in
global value chains.”14 This could be especially valuable for small and medium enterprises
(SMEs), as they “are more likely to succeed in regional markets first, where they are more
familiar with the buyers’ tastes and the standard requirements.”15
Another reason regional integration has been a consistent topic studied in Africa
economics is that integration, in its various forms, can help overcome geographical struggles.
Fifteen states in Sub-Saharan Africa are landlocked, which is “an important contributory factor
to high trade transaction costs, and more generally to the high costs of doing business in
Africa.” 16 These geographical struggles are not the product of domestic politics but were
“largely determined by the continent’s European colonial powers.” 17 All together, these factors
make a “compelling case for these economies to integrate regionally to reap efficiency gains,
exploit economies of scale, and reduce the thickness of borders.”18

in the “commodification of basic material needs and everyday life” and retreat of the conventional welfare and
development ambitions of the state” (Taylor and Soderbaum, 138).
13
Njoroge Kamau, “The Impact of Regional Integration on Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from COMESA,
EAC and SADC Trade Blocs,” American Journal of Social and Management Sciences 2010, 1(2): 150-163
14
Soamiely Andriamananjara, “Regional Route to Global Value Chains.” In Foresight Africa: Top priorities for the
continent in 2016, 2016: 94.
15
Ibid.
16
Trudi Hartzenberg, "Regional Integration in Africa," WTO Staff Working Paper ERS-2011-14, 2011: 3
17
Ibid., 4.
18
De Melo and Tsikata, “Challenges and Prospects,” 1.
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In addition to economic benefits, regional trade agreements often increase the
opportunity cost of war, and thus reduce its risk.19 In addition, regional trade agreements can
“reduce information asymmetries as partners know each other better” and reduce “incentives
for countries not to report their true options in an attempt to extract concessions.” 20 21 Finally,
regional trade agreements can “provide security and confidence to build supra-national
institutions” capable of providing benefits to much larger areas.22

Challenges and Prospects
Despite this potential, regional integration efforts face numerous hurdles. First, regional
economic communities are not all built alike and vary widely in effectiveness—the AFRICA
Regional Integration Index scores demonstrate this. In addition, Aryeetey notes that regional
organizations in sub-Saharan Africa tend to suffer from numerous detracting features, including
the “existence of multiple objectives,” “absence of strong supranational institutions,”
“inadequate sanctioning authority,” “lack of political commitment,” and “poor private sector
participation.”23 Asserting that states in Africa “lack the cultural, political and historical
closeness essential to any common endeavor,24 Chinsinga argues that “the inherent diversity
saps or drains any political will, however rudimentary, upon which the eventual success of

19

Ibid., 8.
Ibid.
21
See Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Principles of International Politics, 5th ed. Los Angeles: Sage/CQ Press, 2014.
22
De Melo and Tsikata, “Challenges and Prospects,” 7.
23
Ernest Aryeetey, “Sub-Saharan African Experiences with Regional Integration,” In Regional Integration and Trade
Liberalization in Subsaharan Africa, Ed. T. Ademola Oyejide, Elbadawi Ibrahim, and Paul Collier. 410-11
24
Sandro Sideri, "Globalisation and Regional Integration," The European Journal of Development Research 9, no. 1
(1997): 38-82.
20
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regional integration initiatives depend.25 Chinsinga also adds that African economies are often
ill-suited to build comparative advantages due to similar export portfolios, weak government
institutions that cannot deliver basic services and infrastructure, and the aforementioned
historically contentious political differences.26
In addition, regional integration policy in Sub-Saharan Africa has historically focused on
“market access at the expense of outsiders” and often ignored “the importance of tackling
behind-the-border impediments to trade”. 27 These “behind-the-border impediments to trade”
often take the form of non-tariff barriers. These non-tariff barriers (NTBs) “hindering regional
trade in the east and southern African region (COMESA, the EAC and SADC) include customs
procedures and administrative requirements, technical standards and the lack of physical
infrastructure.”28 These raise transaction costs and inhibit business across borders, which is
especially problematic because “the private sector will be responsible for the bulk of economic
decisions which are the fabric of regional integration.”29
This shift of focus to non-tariff barriers and the private sector, however, reveals
opportunity along with the problem. If political differences between national governments is an
strong impediment, as numerous scholars suggest, and if non-tariff barriers within (not just
among) states play heavily in preventing further regional integration, then at least a partial

25

Ibid., 118
Blessings Chinsinga, “The Challenges of Globalisation and Regional Integration: The Case of the Southern African
Development Community,” In Democracy, Human Rights and Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa, Ed. by
Milazi, Dominic., Mulinge, Munyae M, Mukamaambo, Elizabeth, and Africa Institute of South Africa, African
Century Publications Series; No. 9. Pretoria, South Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa in Collaboration with
SAUSSC, 2002:117
27
De Melo and Tsikata, “Challenges and Prospects,” 19.
28
Hartzenberg, "Regional Integration," 16
29
Ibid., 19
26
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solution may be found in the private sector and in focusing on domestic policy.30 If “the private
sector will be responsible for the bulk of economic decisions which are the fabric of regional
integration,” then domestic policy facilitating private sector activity may be key to integration
on a larger scale.31 In concert with this concept, Aryeetey suggests that the “growing the
number of firms with an export potential will increase the domestic lobby for further regional
trade liberalization,” citing the West African Enterprise Network, a “coalition of business
people” who lobby to “reduce existing barriers and encourage the flow of capital and service in
the region” as an example.32
That said, the development of supra-national organizations will, by definition, be
essential to regional integration efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, the “the region’s most
significant response” currently to address the many issues facing it is a substantial supra-nation
reorganization.33 This is formation of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area—a
merging of three RECs. This proposed integration of three of the highest performing RECs34, if
successful, would represent a major continental commitment to regional (and continental)
integration projects. It would also address several major issues that have caused regional
integration efforts to stumble in the past:
[The] tripartite FTA among COMESA, EAC, and SADC that should help solve
the overlapping membership dilemma by bringing free trade among the 26
members by: (i) removing tariffs and NTBs and implementing trade
facilitation…(ii) applying the subsidiarity principle to infrastructure to
improve the transport network; (iii) foster industrial development.35

30

This hypothesis is the focus of this study’s quantitative and qualitative work.
Hartzenberg, "Regional Integration," 19
32
Aryeetey, “Sub-Saharan African Experiences,” 414.
33
Meltzer, “Expanding African Trade,” 91.
34
Hartzenberg, "Regional Integration," 13-14
35
De Melo and Tsikata, “Challenges and Prospects,” 19-20
31
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The Tripartite FTA shows promise: as of February 18th 2018, the agreement has 22 state
signatories out of the full 26.36 But even though this supra-national organization has potential
to solve several organizational and bureaucratic issues, each state within it will still likely need
to adopt policies to facilitate integration into the Tripartite FTA. Here again, we may see the
importance of domestic policy aimed at the private sector—specifically, policy that promotes
economic freedom.
In short, while most theories of regional integration identify the private sector as an
important set of actors, it is often unclear how much of a causal role it theoretically plays in the
construction of regional integration. One set of recommendations for regional integration lists
numerous causal factors, but focuses on “economic development at the regional level” and
policy makers developing “public infrastructure and human capital.”37 While the list does
recommend “an increase in the efficiency of the small-scale-production/informal sector,” the
focus is overwhelmingly on “policy coordination, institutional consolidation and administrative
partnerships” at the regional level.38 In this view, the onus of integration rests on the regional
level and successful negotiations between the various states. While pro-business policies are
generally a part of such negotiations, in much of the literature they are represented as
necessarily taking place in the framework of these regional negotiations with regional oversight
and coordination. This project veers from this type of analysis in order to examine purely

36

Phillip Kambafwile. “22 Countries Have Now Signed the Tripartite Agreement.” Common Market for Eastern &
Southern Africa. February 16. http://www.comesa.int/22-countries-have-now-signed-the-tripartite-agreement/.
37
Norbert Fiess and Marco Fugazza, “European Integration: A Review of the Literature and Lessons for NAFTA,”
World Bank, December 2003: 2.
38
Ibid.
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domestic policy and the possible causality of organic private sector action fomenting regional
integration.

Economic Freedom
Economic freedom is a broad concept, but in general it refers to the ability of individuals
and firms to undertake voluntary transactions in a marketplace. In a global world, this simple
understanding becomes complicated as forces and actors on multiple levels regulate, facilitate,
encourage, and discourage these transactions. The Economic Freedom of the World: 2017
Annual Report utilizes data from as far back as 1970 and attempts to define and document
“economic freedom” around the globe. The report describes economic freedom:
The cornerstones of economic freedom are personal choice, voluntary
exchange, open markets, and clearly defined and enforced property rights.
Individuals are economically free when they are permitted to choose for
themselves and engage in voluntary transactions as long as they do not
harm the person or property of others. When economic freedom is
present, the choices of individuals will decide what and how goods and
services are produced. Put another way, economically free individuals will
be permitted to decide for themselves rather than having options imposed
on them by the political process or the use of violence, theft, or fraud by
others.39
The Economic Freedom of the World: 2017 Annual Report index breaks down economic
freedom into five key areas for measurement: “[1] Size of Government, [2] Legal System and
Property Rights, [3] Sound Money [4] Freedom to Trade Internationally, and [5] Regulation of
credit, labor, and business.”40 There areas are further broken down into set and subsets of 42

39

Gwartney, James, Robert Lawson, Joshua Hall, Ryan Murphy, Rosemarie Fike, Richard Grant, Fred McMahon,
Indra De Soysa, and Krishna Vadlamannati. The Economic Freedom of the World: 2017 Annual Report, 2017, Policy
File: 1
40
Ibid., 3
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variables. States receive scores in each of the five area as well as an overall score.41 Overall, the
index represents an attempt at a comprehensive analysis of economic freedom in a given state.
This study will focus specifically on domestic economic freedom and will be using scores
from two of the five key areas the Economic Freedom of the World: 2017 Annual Report
measures: “Legal System and Property Rights” and “Regulation.” These two areas would likely
directly deal with the transaction costs and non-tariff barriers that preclude regional
integration. In addition, these are two factors that a private sector (which is necessary for much
of the legwork of regional integrating) would watch closely. With the theory of private sector
action as essential to regional integration, policies that facilitate domestic economic freedom
and a strong business environment should have a positive relationship with a degree of regional
integration.
Area two of the Economic Freedom of the World: 2017 Annual Report, “Legal System
and Property Rights,” measures the following components to reach its index score:

41

Ibid., 3. The report describes the methodology as follows: “Each component (and sub-component) is placed on a
scale from 0 to 10 that reflects the distribution of the underlying data. When sub-components are present, the
sub-component ratings are averaged to derive the component rating. The component ratings within each area are
then averaged to derive ratings for each of the five areas. In turn, the five area ratings are averaged to derive the
summary rating for each country.”
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fig. 3 (Gwartney, James, Robert Lawson, Joshua Hall, Ryan Murphy, Rosemarie Fike,
Richard Grant, Fred McMahon, Indra De Soysa, and Krishna Vadlamannati, Economic
Freedom, 4)
These components all fall within the realm of domestic politics, and do not necessarily have a
direct effect of regional integration—in other words, they are not necessarily connected to
policymaking specifically aimed at creating stronger regional ties. Should the data analysis show
a relationship between these components and regional integration, then, we may have
evidence toward the causal story of private sector actors. If nothing else, a strong score in this
category may simply mean that the potential to build capital exists, which would make possible
capital investments into regional projects. As Hernando De Soto noted, without strong property
rights, capital is “dead”—only with “institutions that give life to capital” can prosperity exist.42
Area five of the Economic Freedom of the World: 2017 Annual Report index,
“Regulation,” measures the following components and sub-components to reach its index
score:

42

Hernando De Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else,
London: Black Swan, 2001, 16
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fig. 4 (Gwartney, James, Robert Lawson, Joshua Hall, Ryan Murphy, Rosemarie Fike,
Richard Grant, Fred McMahon, Indra De Soysa, and Krishna Vadlamannati, Economic
Freedom, 4)
In the same vein as the previous area, each of these components and sub-components are
shaped by domestic policy and have a significant effect on the private sector. In the context of
regional integration, the difficulties of expanding into a regional business and entering new
areas and states would entail a significant investment. If domestic policies regarding hiring,
administrative requirements, bribes, etc. compound the cost of entering into the market, it
would discourage both domestic and regional growth and investment. In addition, several of
these components fall into the non-tariff barrier category discussed previously.

Quantitative Methodology
This analysis will utilize linear regression to test the relationship between regional
integration and domestic economic freedom in Sub-Saharan African states. While various
international agencies define Sub-Saharan Africa (in contrast to “North Africa”) as including
differing numbers of states, for this study, “Sub-Saharan Africa” will use the World Bank’s 48-

17

state definition. This larger number of states provides more data to analyze (in contrast to the
UNDP’s 46-state definition). Practically, using this 48-state list includes nearly all members of
the African Union-recognized Regional Economic Communities (excluding the Arab Maghreb
Union and its members). The sample used in this analysis is the entire population of SubSaharan African states, with the exception of three states (Eritrea, Sudan, and South Sudan)
which lacked the necessary data to contribute to the analysis. In addition to assessing the
population of Sub-Saharan states, this study will also test a subset of the data from three RECs:
the SADC, EAC, and COMESA. This appears relevant given the continuing development of the
Tripartite Free Trade Agreement between the three RECs discussed in the previous sections.
The Dependent Variable (DV), regional integration, comes from data from the AFRICA
Regional Integration Index. This index (further defined in section 3), measures each African
state's integration into their RECs. The DV is defined as instances of regional integration of SubSaharan African states in RECs. The 48 states of Sub-Saharan Africa are members of seven RECs,
but nearly every state has memberships in two or more RECs. For example, there exist
instances, data points, of Kenya's regional integration into the EAC, CEN-SAD, COMESA, and
IGAD. In the data analysis, this means that the state of Kenya provides four instances of
regional integration to examine. Each of these instances are measured against the same
independent variable of domestic economic freedom. There are two objections to this method
that should be addressed.
The first objection questions the idea of testing instances of integration as opposed to
states as a whole. However, there is no way to aggregate a state's integration to RECs or its
neighbors as a whole. The purpose of this study is to test if domestic economic policy,

18

specifically policy that supports private actors, has a discernible effect on a state's integration
into any and all RECs. The IV is necessarily constant because, for example, Kenya's domestic
economic policies (“Legal System and Property Rights” and “Regulation") do not change when
testing Kenya's integration into various RECs.
A second objection is that multiple instances of identical IV scores (for Kenya, this would
be four identical IV scores) skew the data towards showing a positive relationship. This is not
the case. Kenya's IV score may be relatively high (7.11), but its DV scores vary from .344-.773.
The AFRICA Regional Integration Index notes that
Countries that are members of more than one REC show differences
between their rankings and scores in a particular Dimension in one REC
as opposed to another. This can be explained by historical links,
comparative advantages, regional policies and geography.43
In addition, RECs may have competition objectives and fulfilling one REC's requirements (thus
gaining higher integration in one) may lower integration in another. In other words, there are
numerous factors that affect a state's integration score that fall outside the scope of this
analysis. However, the theoretical framework we are testing would argue that despite all these
intervening variables, we should still see a relationship between the DV and IV because
domestic economic policy would incentivize the private sector. Testing instances of integration
actually strengthens this analysis by at least partially controlling for REC scores that can be
explained by geographical closeness, historical links, or comparative advantages.
The IV is defined as domestic economic freedom and is represented in two ways using
data from the Economic Freedom of the World Report, using two sub-scores of “Legal System

43

“Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016,” 39.

19

and Property Rights” and “Regulation" separately. While the EFW provides an "Overall" score
for economic freedom which may be the broadest analysis, using that score in this analysis is
inherently problematic. This is because some of its sub-scores (such as “Sound Money” and
“Freedom to Trade Internationally”) potentially overlap and mix with Dimensions from the
AFRICA Regional Integration Index (such as “Financial and Macroeconomic integration” and
“Trade Integration”).
The EFW report sub-scores of “Legal System and Property Rights” and “Regulation,”
however, do not have immediate correlating Dimensions or Indicators in the AFRICA Regional
Integration Index. In addition, these two measures are extremely important on the theoretical
level. Theoretically, secure property rights and a relatively relaxed regulation regime should
directly impact the transaction costs and non-tariff-barriers that disincentive the private sector
and thus prevent integration.

Data and Regression Results
As noted above, this data uses the 48-state World Bank definition of Sub-Saharan Africa.
However, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Comoros, São Tomé and Príncipe, South Sudan, and Sudan
are excluded from this analysis due to lack of data in the Economic Freedom of the World
Report, AFRICA Regional Integration Index, or both. The total observations of all other SubSaharan states’ instances of regional integration is 77, and for the proposed tripartite union
(the SADC, EAC, and COMESA) the observations totaled 33.
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Note: The AFRICA Regional Integration Index scores states on a 0-1 scale, while the
Economic Freedom of the World Report scores states on a 1-10 scale. These values were not
changed for the analysis.
Section 1: Legal System and Property Rights
The first dataset is all instances of regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa from the
AFRICA Regional Integration Index paired with the corresponding “Legal System and Property
Rights” from the Economic Freedom of the World Report. Instances are grouped by REC and
descend in order of most integrated to least within each REC.

REC
COMESA
(adjusted)

EAC

SADC
(adjusted)

Member State

Regional Integration
Score

Legal System & Property
Rights Score

Kenya
Zambia
Uganda
Seychelles
Mauritius
Zimbabwe
Rwanda
Madagascar
Dem Rep of Congo
Malawi
Burundi
Swaziland
Ethiopia
Kenya
Uganda
Rwanda
Burundi
Tanzania

0.573
0.565
0.52
0.506
0.47
0.454
0.45
0.42
0.419
0.412
0.401
0.359
0.233
0.656
0.577
0.553
0.48
0.433

4.745102997
5.567048403
4.891804412
5.520896302
6.472556637
3.820360033
7.32142152
2.881012258
2.653119211
4.621099644
3.09182541
4.108752623
4.607092409
4.745102997
4.891804412
7.32142152
3.09182541
5.678049954

South Africa
Botswana
Namibia

0.741
0.559
0.555

5.762888284
6.164800355
6.511178933
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CEN-SAD
(adjusted)

ECCAS
(adjusted)

Zambia
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Mozambique
Seychelles
Mauritius
Lesotho
Malawi
Tanzania
Madagascar
Dem Rep of Congo
Angola

0.523
0.52
0.488
0.483
0.481
0.466
0.386
0.367
0.364
0.343
0.302
0.281

5.567048403
4.108752623
3.820360033
3.96561253
5.520896302
6.472556637
5.762699818
4.621099644
5.678049954
2.881012258
2.653119211
2.960263718

Cote d'Ivoire
Benin
Togo
Senegal
Niger
Mali
Burkina Faso
Gambia
Ghana
Nigeria
Guinea
Kenya
Mauritania
Chad
Guinea-Bissau
Central African
Republic
Liberia

0.641
0.587
0.581
0.569
0.553
0.542
0.538
0.419
0.418
0.384
0.349
0.344
0.331
0.329
0.322

4.557106689
3.580765453
3.688572303
4.237886203
3.414027157
3.626025957
3.597581138
5.259634324
5.44184396
3.609768459
2.976011266
4.745102997
3.280492271
2.76778205
3.860624883

0.303
0.252

1.849276407
4.67597891

Cameroon
Gabon
Rep of Congo
Chad
Central African
Republic
Rwanda
Angola
Burundi
Dem Rep Congo

0.664
0.58
0.531
0.512

3.257379298
3.900636296
3.408225775
2.76778205

0.507
0.485
0.325
0.276
0.196

1.849276407
7.32142152
2.960263718
3.09182541
2.653119211
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ECOWAS
(adjusted)

IGAD

Cote d'Ivoire
Togo
Senegal
Niger
Benin
Ghana
Burkina Faso
Mali
Nigeria
Guinea-Bissau
Gambia
Cape Verde
Liberia
Guinea
Sierra Leone
Kenya
Uganda
Ethiopia

0.675
0.671
0.628
0.556
0.548
0.546
0.537
0.525
0.501
0.5
0.447
0.439
0.357
0.301
0.404
0.773
0.701
0.428

Results:
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations
P-value

0.257637963
0.06637732
0.053929017
0.119398552
77
0.023689973

4.557106689
3.688572303
4.237886203
3.414027157
3.580765453
5.44184396
3.597581138
3.626025957
3.609768459
3.860624883
5.259634324
6.07731726
4.67597891
2.976011266
3.965239946
4.745102997
4.891804412
4.607092409
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The second dataset is all instances of regional integration within the proposed tripartite
union of the SADC, EAC, and COMESA from the AFRICA Regional Integration Index paired with
the corresponding “Legal System and Property Rights” score from the Economic Freedom of the
World Report. Instances are grouped by REC and descend in order of most integrated to least
within each REC.

REC
Member State
COMESA
(adjusted) Kenya
Zambia

Regional Integration
Score
0.573
0.565

Legal System & Property Rights Score
4.745102997
5.567048403
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EAC

Uganda
Seychelles
Mauritius
Zimbabwe
Rwanda
Madagascar
Dem Rep of
Congo
Malawi
Burundi
Swaziland
Ethiopia
Kenya
Uganda
Rwanda
Burundi
Tanzania

SADC
(adjusted) South Africa
Botswana
Namibia
Zambia
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Mozambique
Seychelles
Mauritius
Lesotho
Malawi
Tanzania
Madagascar
Dem Rep of
Congo
Angola
Results:
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error

0.431303391
0.186022615
0.15976528
0.097606123

0.52
0.506
0.47
0.454
0.45
0.42

4.891804412
5.520896302
6.472556637
3.820360033
7.32142152
2.881012258

0.419
0.412
0.401
0.359
0.233
0.656
0.577
0.553
0.48
0.433

2.653119211
4.621099644
3.09182541
4.108752623
4.607092409
4.745102997
4.891804412
7.32142152
3.09182541
5.678049954

0.741
0.559
0.555
0.523
0.52
0.488
0.483
0.481
0.466
0.386
0.367
0.364
0.343

5.762888284
6.164800355
6.511178933
5.567048403
4.108752623
3.820360033
3.96561253
5.520896302
6.472556637
5.762699818
4.621099644
5.678049954
2.881012258

0.302
0.281

2.653119211
2.960263718
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Observations
P-Value

33
0.012209444

COMESA-EAC-SADC Dataset
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Section 2: Regulation
The first dataset consists of all instances of regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa
from the AFRICA Regional Integration Index paired with the corresponding “Regulation” score
from the Economic Freedom of the World Report. Instances are grouped by REC and descend in
order of most integrated to least within each REC.
REC
Member State
COMESA
(adjusted) Kenya
Zambia

Regional Integration Score

Regulation Score
0.573
0.565

7.285672899
6.427933792
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EAC

Uganda
Seychelles
Mauritius
Zimbabwe
Rwanda
Madagascar
Dem Rep of Congo
Malawi
Burundi
Swaziland
Ethiopia
Kenya
Uganda
Rwanda
Burundi
Tanzania

SADC
(adjusted) South Africa
Botswana
Namibia
Zambia
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Mozambique
Seychelles
Mauritius
Lesotho
Malawi
Tanzania
Madagascar
Dem Rep of Congo
Angola
CEN-SAD
(adjusted) Cote d'Ivoire
Benin
Togo
Senegal
Niger
Mali
Burkina Faso
Gambia

0.52
0.506
0.47
0.454
0.45
0.42
0.419
0.412
0.401
0.359
0.233
0.656
0.577
0.553
0.48
0.433

7.894807884
7.39581686
8.186706935
4.308080892
8.37415247
5.864701176
5.743211571
5.750041671
7.274866867
7.625161417
6.046571454
7.285672899
7.894807884
8.37415247
7.274866867
7.26060323

0.741
0.559
0.555
0.523
0.52
0.488
0.483
0.481
0.466
0.386
0.367
0.364
0.343
0.302
0.281

7.366127744
7.870525791
7.811357447
6.427933792
7.625161417
4.308080892
5.23079357
7.39581686
8.186706935
7.499251603
5.750041671
7.26060323
5.864701176
5.743211571
6.065583361

0.641
0.587
0.581
0.569
0.553
0.542
0.538
0.419

6.6948113
6.626199593
6.218544758
6.014800903
6.847945767
6.74588757
6.524377079
6.75185889
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Ghana
Nigeria
Guinea
Kenya
Mauritania
Chad
Guinea-Bissau
Central African
Republic
Liberia
ECCAS
(adjusted) Cameroon
Gabon
Rep of Congo
Chad
Central African
Republic
Rwanda
Angola
Burundi
Dem Rep Congo
ECOWAS
(adjusted) Cote d'Ivoire
Togo
Senegal
Niger
Benin
Ghana
Burkina Faso
Mali
Nigeria
Guinea-Bissau
Gambia
Cape Verde
Liberia
Guinea
Sierra Leone
IGAD
Kenya
Uganda
Ethiopia

0.418
0.384
0.349
0.344
0.331
0.329
0.322

6.849823589
7.349102039
6.608530123
7.285672899
6.380096816
4.906243704
6.334990223

0.303
0.252

5.255901557
5.997896268

0.664
0.58
0.531
0.512

6.288674279
6.590276872
5.536996435
4.906243704

0.507
0.485
0.325
0.276
0.196

5.255901557
8.37415247
6.065583361
7.274866867
5.743211571

0.675
0.671
0.628
0.556
0.548
0.546
0.537
0.525
0.501
0.5
0.447
0.439
0.357
0.301
0.404
0.773
0.701
0.428

6.6948113
6.218544758
6.014800903
6.847945767
6.626199593
6.849823589
6.524377079
6.74588757
7.349102039
6.334990223
6.75185889
6.679492305
5.997896268
6.608530123
4.660122023
7.285672899
7.894807884
6.046571454
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Results:
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations
P-Value

0.267934064
0.071788663
0.059412512
0.119052028
77
0.018477561
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Regional Integration Score

The second dataset includes all instances of regional integration within the proposed
tripartite union of the SADC, EAC, and COMESA from the AFRICA Regional Integration Index
paired with the corresponding “Regulation” score from the Economic Freedom of the World
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Report. Instances are grouped by REC and descend in order of most integrated to least within
each REC.
REC
Member State
COMESA
(adjusted) Kenya
Zambia
Uganda
Seychelles
Mauritius
Zimbabwe
Rwanda
Madagascar
Dem Rep of Congo
Malawi
Burundi
Swaziland
Ethiopia
EAC
Kenya
Uganda
Rwanda
Burundi
Tanzania
SADC
(adjusted) South Africa
Botswana
Namibia
Zambia
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Mozambique
Seychelles
Mauritius
Lesotho
Malawi
Tanzania
Madagascar
Dem Rep of Congo
Angola

Regional Integration Score

Regulation Score
0.573
0.565
0.52
0.506
0.47
0.454
0.45
0.42
0.419
0.412
0.401
0.359
0.233
0.656
0.577
0.553
0.48
0.433

7.285672899
6.427933792
7.894807884
7.39581686
8.186706935
4.308080892
8.37415247
5.864701176
5.743211571
5.750041671
7.274866867
7.625161417
6.046571454
7.285672899
7.894807884
8.37415247
7.274866867
7.26060323

0.741
0.559
0.555
0.523
0.52
0.488
0.483
0.481
0.466
0.386
0.367
0.364
0.343
0.302
0.281

7.366127744
7.870525791
7.811357447
6.427933792
7.625161417
4.308080892
5.23079357
7.39581686
8.186706935
7.499251603
5.750041671
7.26060323
5.864701176
5.743211571
6.065583361
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Results:
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations
P-Value

0.362788352
0.131615388
0.103602981
0.100815417
33
0.037987447

COMESA-EAC-SADC
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The data above and the regression analysis shows a robust and significant relationship
between domestic economic freedom and regional integration independent of other variables.
Domestic reforms supporting economic freedom do play a causal role in regional integration in
Sub-Saharan African states. This also suggests that protectionist reforms toward regional
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integration, while historically part-and-parcel of building RECs, is likely counterproductive.44
For the “Legal System and Property Rights” scores, the regression suggests a 5.3% causality for
regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa states as a whole and 15.9% for the COMESA-SADCEAC bloc. For “Regulation,” scores, the regression suggests a 5.9% causality for regional
integration in Sub-Saharan Africa states as a whole and 10.3% for the COMESA-SADC-EAC bloc.
It can also be noted that the number of observations and the p-values of the various analyses
support rejecting the null hypothesis.
These significant relationships are even more important when one considers the other
major factors affecting regional integration, such as roads and infrastructure, stable currency,
presence of complementary industries, etc. In other words, despite the influence of factors
without which regional integration would be virtually impossible (lack of quality infrastructure,
for example), purely domestic reforms toward economic freedom have between 5.3% and
15.9% causality for regional integration as a whole. The possible causality outlined in the
introduction, as well as the case study to follow, suggests that economic freedom also works in
a complementary fashion with other pro-regional integration reforms and policies on the
political level by empowering the private sector to influence state decision-making.
In addition to this strong quantitative evidence, this study requires a descriptive theory
of how the relationship manifests in actual political and economic history. There are still
questions as to paths of causality, which actors play significant roles, and the precise role of the
private sector relative to the public sector. A case study, taking into account both theoretical
and historical evidence, can contribute to filling these gaps and reveal the potential causal

44
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mechanisms between economic freedom and regional integration—in other words, how
economic freedom and an empowered private sector actually contribute to regional
integration. This project will therefore utilize one, using the “plausibility probe” method to
uncover potential evidence and patterns for further research.45

Case Study Methodology
The second part of this project offers a case study exploring possible causal explanations
for the regression results, which in instances show a significant relationship between domestic
economic freedom and regional integration. While the introductory literature review suggests
some general possible causal paths, it does not explore any specific scenario in detail. Specific
case studies, as McNabb argues, can be integral in developing causal explanations to predict
future behavior.46 Case studies, if well-designed, can be used to test specific theories and
develop new ones. In addition, the methodology of a case study should be cross-applicable to
other situations to allow for further testing of a theories. According to George and Bennett, this
data gathering proceeds by asking general questions that can be applied to any relevant case.47
These questions, if they can be asked of any case a theory is purported to explain, facilitate
external validity through comparative cases.
While there are several possible methods that case studies can employ to uncover
relevant information, only a few promise the potential to contribute to this analysis. This

45

Alexander George and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. BCSIA
Studies in International Security. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005, 75
46
David McNabb, Research Methods for Political Science : Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 2nd ed.
Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2010, 227.
47
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current project does not attempt a multivariate analysis nor does it attempt to form a
comprehensive causal theory. In many case studies, the focus is on exploring or explaining a
primary causal variable key to a theoretical framework. The quantitative data upon which this
case study will be built only finds the causal relationship from economic freedom to regional
integration to be between 5.3% and 15.9% (for both measures). Because of this, it is likely that
economic freedom is not the single largest causal factor of regional integration success, but
only a significant contributing factor.
The struggle with all case studies is controlling for alternative causes and focusing on the
most likely causal story.48 While researchers may focus on a single case in theory development
or testing, George and Bennett suggest that the traditional single case study is limited and that
comparative work is more likely to yield externally valid results and address the problem of
alternative causes.49 Though a comparative study would be more advantageous, this paper will
only examine the single case of Botswana. This does not mean this particular example is
useless. The methodology (specifically the questions asked of this case and the indicators
found) can be cross-applied to other Sub-Saharan cases. In addition, Botswana can be
considered a version of what George and Bennett call a “crucial case.”50 The crucial case study
methodology argues that in the event that a theory is sufficiently precise in its predictions, a
“crucial-case study” can be relevant despite the “n=1 problem”.51 Harry Eckstein argues that
“crucial-case studies…may permit sufficiently precise theories to be refuted by one

48
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observation.”52 While Eckstein’s original conception of the crucial-case study has serious
methodological issues, his logic regarding the limits of single crucial case studies can be utilized
to frame this project’s case study. Henry Brady and David Collier, in Rethinking Social Inquiry,
have a more favorable view of the crucial case study, arguing that “what matters…is that a
causal mechanism has been identified, and the researcher has some framework within which to
begin to investigate the validity of the causal claim.”53
Since this project examines a smaller variable than typical crucial case studies, it will not
attempt to justify a monocausal explanation, but will present a “plausibility probe.” These are
described as “preliminary studies on relatively untested theories and hypotheses to determine
whether more intensive…testing is warranted.”54 With the quantitative portion as a foundation,
this case study will attempt to tease out evidence supporting the contention that economic
freedom’s facilitation of the private sector supports regional integration.
Widely considered one of the most economically free states in Africa, Botswana also
scores high on the AFRICA Regional Integration Index. Because of its prima facie correlation of
the hypothesis, Botswana can be considered an alternative version of the crucial case study
that does not attempt to disprove the hypothesis by testing a precise theory, but still has the
potential to suggest the null hypothesis. If no qualitative evidence of policies promoting
economic freedom and the facilitation of the private sector leading to increased regional
integration can be found, then the theoretical causal mechanism will be “strongly impugned.”55
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If a relationship can be found, however, then further study into the precise mechanisms on a
larger scale may be warranted and the theory will have passed a small, but important test of
legitimacy.
This brief case study tests the plausibility of the hypothesis that a partial solution to
regional integration may be found in the private sector. As noted in previous sections, if it is
true that “the private sector will be responsible for the bulk of economic decisions which are
the fabric of regional integration,” then domestic policy facilitating private sector activity may
be a part of the causal story of regional integration.56 With domestic economic freedom (which
can be understood as a proxy for private sector facilitation) already shown to be a
quantitatively likely causal factor in regional integration, this case study will tease out the some
of the historical causal mechanisms and actions by which this happens. It will specifically look
for patterns and observations concerning private-public coordination on policy measures and
data regarding NTBs (which, as shown, feature heavily in discussions of the private sector and
regional integration). 57

Case Study: Botswana
Botswana has long been an interesting exception to many of the pathologies that have
plagued post-colonial African states. Since independence in 1966, Botswana has enjoyed
“uninterrupted civilian leadership, progressive social policies, and significant capital
investment.”58 It boasts a multi-party democracy, though the Botswana Democratic Party has
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controlled the government since independence.59 Its judiciary is considered relatively
independent, and is considered one of the least corrupt states in Africa. It is a relatively small
parliamentary republic of just over 2 million people, but “maintained one of the world's highest
economic growth rates since independence” until the 2008 financial crisis. While a significant
portion of its economy depends on diamond and other mineral exports, Botswana has generally
avoided the governance issues associated with dependence on natural resources (referred to as
the “resource curse”).60 The government of Botswana has made repeated efforts to invest in
human capital and education to diversify its economy, to mixed success. A landlocked state,
Botswana has made regional cooperation and trade a priority, and even hosts the headquarters
of the SADC.
Unlike most African states, Botswana is a member of only one REC, the SADC. The
AFRICA Regional Integration Index gives Botswana’s integration with the SADC a score of .559,
second to only South Africa, the largest economy in the SADC (and depending on the year,
Africa). The AFRICA Regional Integration Index further notes:
At 8 percent of GDP, Botswana has the sixth-highest share of intra-SADC
exports to GDP (excluding re-exports) among the 13 members of the bloc
for which data was available. It also has the third-highest share of intraSADC imports to GDP among the 15 members, amounting to 37 percent of
GDP. Indeed, given that SADC appears to be the most trade-integrated
regional economic community on the continent, Botswana scores strongly
in this dimension overall relative to other African countries. However,
trade between Botswana and other SADC member States may not be as
high as it could be because of limited complementarity of goods.61
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In terms of economic freedom, Botswana is an exceptional case. The Economic Freedom of the
World: 2017 Annual Report gives Botswana an overall score 7.37, and on the sub-scores of
“Legal System and Property Rights” and “Regulation” Botswana scores 6.16 and 7.87,
respectively. These scores place Botswana at 50th worldwide and 3rd in Sub-Saharan Africa,
behind only Mauritius at 7th worldwide and Rwanda at 31st worldwide.62
Despite placing behind Mauritius and Rwanda in economic freedom, Botswana is the
preferable state of study. Both Mauritius and Rwanda have unique issues that make them less
than ideal for examining regional integration policy over time. In the case of Rwanda, the 1994
genocide during which close to a million Tutsis were killed by the Hutu government represents
something like a critical juncture, which severely complicates any political analysis. Any
examination of Rwanda would necessarily take into account the genocide and reforms that
followed from it as central to Rwanda’s current state. In short, Rwanda represents an atypical
situation from which little comparative data is likely to be useful for the question of this study.
The other possible case, Mauritius, is an island state 1,200 miles off the African Coast. While
technically included in analyses of Sub-Saharan Africa, as an island not part of the African
continent proper, it also is an exception to the more typical Sub-Saharan state. For this and
other reasons, suffice it to say that conclusions drawn from a study of Mauritius would not
likely be cross-applicable to continental African states. On the other hand, Botswana represents
an excellent case with a high economic freedom score, a landlocked status on continental

62

Gwartney, James, Robert Lawson, Joshua Hall, Ryan Murphy, Rosemarie Fike, Richard Grant, Fred McMahon,
Indra De Soysa, and Krishna Vadlamannati, Economic Freedom.

38

Africa, and a relevant policy pattern that can be, as will be shown, traced back to the early
1990s.
In late 2013, the Republic of Botswana published an article entitled “Government
Partners with Private Sector” on their official website. It detailed the remarks of the Vice
President of Botswana, Dr. Ponatshego Kedikilwe, at a conference in Botswana. The Vice
President’s speech included references to several important current and historical elements
that directly pertain to policies promoting economic freedom and business, to the political
representation of private industry, and to private-public coordination on policy measures.
Regarding policies promoting economic freedom, one of the most notable political
events is the passage of Incomes Policy of 1990, which “was aimed at improving the growth of
the private sector by removing red tape and promoting free markets.”63 This policy reform
specifically removed price controls for wages implemented in the 1972 Incomes Policy under
the idea that “the private sector had…grown and needed to be de-linked from the government
pay structure to encourage its growth and competitiveness.”64 While some minimum wages
laws were retained for specific classes of workers, the 1990 Policy represented a major shift in a
previously highly-regulated market. In addition, this policy is also remarkable because it was
implemented domestically and “voluntarily” (in contrast to structural adjustment programs or
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other international intervention).65 This voluntary adoption seems to be a product of
Botswana’s governing economic philosophy. Happy Kufigwa Siphambe writes that Botswana’s…
…development strategy has been based on the philosophy of free
enterprise and a market economy, and successive national development
plans have always emphasised that the role of the government in the
economy is that of a facilitator of economic growth and development
rather than an active participant.66
The themes of economic freedom, open markets, and government non-interference have been
consistent across time in government rhetorical signaling, in addition to the data already
presented. Take the following quote as a further example:
“The government’s approach towards economic development is to have
the private sector as the engine of growth and we have formulated
privatisation policy which should enable the private sector to play an
increased role in the various sectors of the economy,” he said. …“Our
decision has been vindicated by evidence that economies prosper and lift
people out of poverty when government focuses on good regulation and
creation of an enabling environment, while the private sector is allowed to
get on with the business of business,” the vice President said.67
The Vice President’s speech at the conference closely correlates Siphambe’s assertion of the
government’s stance toward the private sector and economic freedom.
Botswana has a demonstrable positive stance toward economic freedom and the
private sector, but has this stance resulted in the robust (and political) private sector that the
hypothesis would predict? It seems so—the report of the conference mentions positively two
institutions that facilitate public-private conversation and policy-making in Botswana: the High
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Level Consultative Council (HLCC) and the Botswana Economic Advisory Council (BEAC). This
paper will focus on the HLCC.
The HLCC, founded in 1996 as part of the “Vision 2016” document and “described as a
‘people’s manifesto’ for long-term development of the country, argues that Botswana ‘cannot
afford an adversarial relationship between Government and business’.”68 The Vision 2016 “was
itself a particularly inclusive process in which the private sector was given considerable
opportunity to shape thinking,” resulting in lasting public-private dialogue and partnerships, the
final form of which was the HLCC.69
The HLCC, which is chaired by the president and filled with representatives from various
industries and businesses, has the goal of facilitating private sector growth, which often means
removing government-imposed obstacles. As a forum for the private sector to propose dialogue
and push policy, the HLCC boasts numerous documented successes over the years:
A number of policies and initiatives are thus now in place that arose from
the National Business Conference and the HLCC. Significant examples
include the following:
• establishment of the HLCC itself;
• establishment of the Botswana Export Development and
Investment Agency (BEDIA);
• the decision to scrap foreign-exchange controls;
• promotion of citizen economic empowerment which led to
creation of the Citizen Entrepreneur Development Agency;
• initiation of the debate on privatisation which led to the
adoption of a policy on privatization….70 [emphasis added]
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While not a complete list, the emphasized portions illustrate a significant commitment on
behalf of Botswana political forces to policies that facilitate business and foreign engagements
(the foreign-exchange controls being one). The HLCC has certainly seen historic success, though
recently some concerns have been raised about the effectiveness of the HLCC after the
retirement of long-reigning President Festus Mogae.71 Regardless, in making a case for causal
mechanisms, the positive feedback loop of the economic freedom, private sector political
participation, and Botswana’s economic performance are only supported by this evidence.
In regards to the second set of data, the link between policies promoting economic
freedom domestically and reducing NTBs is partially axiomatic. As previously noted, NTBs can
include a wide variety of phenomena. Wentworth includes a short list of the most common:
NTBs are restrictions imposed by government policies, private sector
practices or protectionist industry actions against foreign companies. They
include import bans or product specific quotas; complex or discriminatory
rules of origin; complex procedures and administrative requirements;
unreasonable technical standards; multiplicity of foreign exchange
controls; and lack of adequate physical infrastructure. These impediments
increase the cost and complexity of trading and doing business across
borders.72
Policies supporting domestic economic freedom by definition include addressing several of
these issues. Measurement of at least some of these NTB categories is already included in the
Economic Freedom of the World: 2017 Annual Report. The two categories this study examines
(“Legal System and Property Rights” and “Regulation”) already measure bureaucracy costs,
credit regulations, regulatory and costs of property sale, all of which parallel Wentworth’s list to
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some degree. As an aside, the NTB of a “multiplicity of foreign exchange controls,” the
elimination of which in Botswana is an accomplishment of the HCLL, represents an example of a
significant direct private sector act toward building regional integration.
Perhaps more enlightening than the obvious connection between domestic freedom
and the elimination of NTBs is the realized practice of this in Botswana. Thomas and Marandu
conducted an extensive study of Small and Medium Enterprises in Botswana and their
perspectives on South African trade. Most striking is the frustration of Botswana businesses
with the inefficiencies of neighboring states:
[They found] in interviews with numerous SME in Botswana a consistent
frustration at the comparative issues in exporting to surrounding nations—
non standardization of permits, visas, etc. duties, vague regulatory
standards, [and] arbitrary taxes…73
The problems were not unique to any particular sector, but nearly universal. Further, their
study correlates previous data that “African manufacturers in countries that have trade
restrictions, cumbersome regulations and deficient customs administration, tend to be unlikely
to export.”74 The study further suggests that even though Botswana has conducted domestic
reforms with potential to aid its export capacity and regional integration (on which it already
scores well in the AFRICA Regional Integration Index), it is probably held back by inefficiencies
in surrounding states. This likely contributes to the upper limit of domestic economic freedom’s
contribution to regional integration. Even when a state’s businesses are ready and willing to
form regional connections, if the surrounding states do not already have a domestic

73

Thomas, A. O., and E. Marandu, "Rhetoric and realities of regional integration: Botswana SME perspectives on
Southern African trade," South African Journal of Business Management 48, no. 2, 2017: 81.
74
Ibid., 81.

43

commitment to economic freedom, it limits private sector movement in all states. So while the
causal story of the economic freedom of property rights and regulations leading to political
cooperation and facilitation of good domestic policy with private sector feedback, any given
state ultimately will be limited by the degree to which its fellow REC members domestically
commit to economic freedom. Despite this, the prospect of establishing a virtuous circle that
both builds the business networks necessarily for regional integration and the political will to
maintain them is an enticing one and is likely worth pursuing.
While there are numerous alternative and complementary factors in regional
integration and private sector facilitation (infrastructure featuring high on the list), this study
will not attempt to reconcile them with the data and analysis already presented, as their
importance is already well-established. This study’s purpose has been to determine the degree
to which economic freedom can influence regional integration and establish its limits. So while
a clear and complete causal pattern is not certain due to the aforementioned overlapping
factors, there remains sufficient evidence to support the level of causality that the data
suggests, warranting further research into the political effects of strengthening the private
sector on policies that support and/or hinder regional integration efforts.

Conclusion and Further Research
While this study has made a foray into the question of domestic economic freedom and
regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa, the question is far from resolved. More precise
quantitative measures and differing metrics could add nuance and specificity as to which
policies within the broad category of economic freedom carry the most causal weight on each
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of the various aspects of regional integration. Other permutations and indices could be utilized
to conduct broad examinations of under-examined factors. For example, perhaps policies
exclusively concerning property rights, possibly measured by the International Property Rights
Index, are more relevant than those concerning regulation or other facets of economic
freedom.75 It is also possible that purely pro-business policies, over which economic freedom
only partially overlaps, provide a better dataset to examine, perhaps measured with the World
Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index.
One potential weakness of this study is its lack of multivariate analysis. However, this
likely could be constructed rather quickly using the subcategory data from the Economic
Freedom of the World: 2017 and AFRICA Regional Integration Index. One also could quibble
with the design of the AFRICA Regional Integration Index and its designation of equal weight
among its factors. Focusing on one or two factors to the exclusion of others also may prove a
rich opportunity for research.
As already noted on the case study portion of the paper, a single case provides limited
evidence. While enough of a causal pattern was found to justify further examination, that
examination, both of cases that seem to fit the hypothesis and those that do not, has yet to be
undertaken. While the quantitative analysis and plausibility probe both uphold a strong
relationship between domestic economic freedom and regional integration, a precise and
nuanced causal theory is less than fully established. This does not mean that one cannot draw
implications for development policy and governance. This study’s findings are consistent with
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other scholars who find strong correlations between economic freedom and various kinds of
advanced economic development. Domestic policy that removes NTBs and empowers the
private sector by improving legal institutions and limiting excessive regulations can be a path to
both domestic growth and regional integration. This opportunity for facilitating regional
integration through domestic policy—that is, without requiring political cooperation from the
various states—is a route less-examined but worthy of further explication. This study offers a
useful starting point, but much work remains to be done to tease out the full breadth of the
quantitative and qualitative relationship between the variables.
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Appendix 2: On Faith and Learning

I lived in Uganda, East Africa, for five years while my parents worked at an NGO that
offered education, housing, medical services, vocational training, and community to orphans,
at-risk children, and young adults. Africa was foreign much of the time, but it was still home.
And as a kid, living there meant riding through trails surrounded by tall bush, bumping along
long red dirt roads, and endless hours under the hot sun. Now, as a student finishing my
undergraduate thesis examining economic policy across Sub-Saharan Africa, my gaze has
expanded and been informed by the numerous sources of knowledge I have been privileged to
encounter. These sources include practicing my Catholic Christian faith, befriending students
from diverse and divergent background on SPU’s campus, studying under brilliant and generous
professors, reading post-colonial literature at Oxford University, building my personal library
(beliefs alongside), and learning the complexities of political science, my undergraduate field of
study.
The Gospel says “Then you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.” There is
a sentiment in the verse that echoes, I think, to both my faith and my profession. Political
science has the duty to pursue objective, empirical truth (inasmuch as a social science can), and
this honors project has been an attempt to contribute to that. Its goal is to hypothesize and
test, seeking to avoid mistakes, manage uncertainty, and seek the best possible solutions to the
problems that civilizations face. It also has the duty to explicate what we know of human
nature, and to project systems and ideals grappling with its contours.
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On the most basic level, then, my attachment to this honors project is both personal
(from my childhood) and professional (from my intellectual focus). Underlying both is a
commitment to service. As Christians, we are called to use our talents to serve those around us.
This project, which aims to contribute to poverty alleviation and forward stable political
institutions, is an important and worthwhile task for a Christian to pursue. While much progress
still needs to be made, there is (in my experience as one once deeply involved in Christian
missionary work and now as a student of political science) an ever-growing recognition of the
complexity of both political and mission work and the mistakes that have been made due to
simplistic thinking.
But of what nature is this progress? The Glory Be is a simple prayer, expressing faith in a
triune God, and affirming an eschatological “end” to reality—
Glory be to the Father,
and to the Son,
and to the Holy Spirit.
As it was in the beginning,
is now,
and ever shall be,
world without end.
Amen.
While this prayer expresses confidence, it is not confidence in the future, but in the everpresent now that will not pass from the safety of God’s hand. The world, whatever state it may
be in, does not contradict and cannot subsume the larger reality the Glory Be affirms. Human
progress pales in comparison to the timeless truth the prayer latches onto. As it was in the
beginning, is now, and ever shall be…
Politics, on the other hand, has always been something closer to constant crisis
management. We have found, through decades of experimentation and loss, that some ideas
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work, and that some ideas do not. While there are no universal axioms by which to perfectly
imagine a society, there are rules that have proven by-and-large successful across time and
space. These rules only have ever promised limited success, no matter the arena—and this is
how it should be. This is the nature of politics, which depends not on an unmoved mover, but
the ebbing minds and hearts of the mover’s creation. Political science, in its proper expression,
is a humble science, accepting a limited understanding of humanity and possibility.
The arrogance of doctrine, theological, political, or otherwise, that treats humans as
means to end, humans as simple cogs or forces, and assumes the mantle of wisdom to remake
society in its image must always be rejected. Humans are not clay to be molded (only the Potter
may do that). Humans cannot write wholly just laws (only the Lawgiver may do that). Humans
cannot lead eternally or unfailingly (only the King may do that). Too many post-independence
projects in Africa and around the world have promised this utopia and cast its adherents into
only greater misery. But what, then, are we left with if we must abandon our worldly hope? Is
waiting for death and spiritual renewal all we have? A thousand times, no.
The response is to be humble, to be careful, to be kind. The alternative to this arrogance
and wild certainty is to embrace the Christian principle of tension, as Leszek Kolakowski, the
eminent political philosopher describes:
Christianity has neither found nor promised any lasting solution to man’s temporal lot. It
has thus provided us with a way out of the pessimism/optimism dilemma, if it is seen as
a dilemma between belief in the ultimate solutions and despair. The generation into
despair is common among those who once believed in a perfect and ultimate solution and
later lost that certainty. But it is the tradition of Christian teaching to shield us from both
these perils: from the wild certainty of our infinite capacity for perfection on the one hand
and from suicide on the other. (Modernity on Endless Trial)
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My project seeks to walk the line that Christianity itself does, between the twin destructions of
utopia and anarchy. My project, informed by faith and humility, hopes to take a step towards
limited good.

